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ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030146-CA
v.
NEIL STEVEN PIXTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court commit plain error in declining to reduce the charges
against defendant from a third degree felony to a class B misdemeanor for a third DUI
conviction in 10 years?
Standard of Review: This issue involves interpretation of a version of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44 in effect when defendant committed his third offense ("the 2001 statute").
The trial court sentenced defendant under a newer, amended version of the statute with
slightly different language ("the 2002 statute"). Because defendant did not ask the court
to consider whether he should be sentenced under the 2001 statute—or whether it would
make any difference— defendant proceeds under the "onerous plain error standard."
State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 9005 906 (Utah App. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 925
P.2d 937 (1996). To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate: (i) an error

occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information with one count of driving under the
influence, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. R. 10.
Defendant filed a motion to reduce the charge from a third degree felony to a class
B misdemeanor. The trial court heard argument on that motion and later denied it. R. 89.
On December 9, 2002, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the
right to appeal the court's denial of the motion to reduce the charges. R. 78.
On February 3, 2003, the court imposed a suspended prison term of zero-to-five
years and placed defendant on probation for 36 months. R. 91. The court also imposed a
$2,000 fine and ordered defendant to complete inpatient treatment for alcoholism. R. 93.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 99.
During oral argument before this court on February 25, 2004, both the State and
defendant suggested that the Court allow supplemental briefing because the parties had
briefed the case under the most recent 2002 version of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, instead
of the 2001 version, which was in effect at the time defendant committed his third DUI
offense. The Court initially declined this request, but on March 1, 2004, issued an order
requesting supplemental briefing.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of analyzing the issues raised in this appeal, the Court need only
focus on the following chronology of events:
A

-

* 998: First arrest (Sandy). Defendant was charged by citation with

driving under the influence. R. 52.
May 6,1998: First conviction. Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the
influence, a class B misdemeanor, and received a 30-day jail term and a $1,000 fine. R.
51-53. The jail term was suspended, although defendant apparently did spend 30 days in
jail in the summer of 1999 for unspecified probation violations. R. 56.
January 11, 2001: Second arrest (South Jordan). Defendant was arrested for
DUI in South Jordan and charged with a class B misdemeanor. R. 59.
May 1S >001: Third Arrest (Murray). Defendant was arrested and charged by
information with driving under the influence in Murray Justice Court. The case was
initially charged as a class B misdemeanor.
May J"4, .""Oil! Si UIIHI i niii'i irliou. Defendant pie, ui,.v: guilty to alcohol-related
reckless driving in connection with the South Jordan charges. R. 5?.
December 3, 2001: Murray charges dismissed. After learning of the May 24,
2001, conviction on the South Jordan charges, the Murray City prosecutor concluded that
the case must be charged as a third degree felony because it was defendant's third DUI-

3

related conviction within a 10-year period. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(A). The
charges were dismissed without prejudice. R. 60.
June 21, 2002: Murray charges refiled. The Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
filed third degree felony charges in connection with the Murray DUI due to defendant's
two prior convictions for alcohol-related driving offenses. R. 4-5.
December 9, 2002: Third conviction. Defendant pleaded guilty to the Murray
DUI charge. R. 73-80.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM BELOW.

Defendant claims in his supplemental brief that his argument concerning the
proper interpretation of the statute was preserved before the trial court because he filed a
"motion to reduce charge" in which he argued that "the plain language of the statute
requires that Mr. Pixton be charged with a class B misdemeanor because [he] did not have
two prior convictions within ten years of the charge at issue . . . " Aplt. Supp. Br. at 11.
However, the version of the statute cited to the trial court by the State and defendant was
the 2002 version. Because the focus below was exclusively on the 2002 statute, the
argument defendant now makes to this Court under the 2001 statute is unpreserved.1

1

Defendant claims in his supplemental brief that the ruling on the motion to reduce
his charge shows that the trial court was relying on the 2001 version of the statute and
that the issue was, thus, preserved. Aplt. Supp. Br. at 13. However, although the trial
court appears to cite to the 2001 version of the statute, the quoted language shows that the
court was actually referring to the 2002 version. In rejecting defendant's interpretation,
4

The current version of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 states:
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person . . .
has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical
test shows that person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation
or actual physical control.

(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is
a third degree felony if it is . .. a third or subsequent
conviction under this section within ten years of two or more
prior convictions;...
(Emphasis added.) Under this version, the trial court properly rejected defendant's
argument that his two prior convictions must be in place before the third offense may be
charged as a third degree felony. The trial court was never asked to evaluate defendant's
argument in light of the version of the statute in effect at the time, which stated:
A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third
degree felony if it is committed . . . . within ten years of two
or more prior convictions under this section.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (2001). Because the trial court was never asked to
interpret the language of the 2001 version, it committed no error in properly interpreting
the statute before it.

the court stated that "the enhancement applies upon a third 'conviction' within the
prescribed time period; it does not address dates of arrest, nor dates when charged." See
Findings, Conclusions & Order Denying Motion to Reduce Charge, dated February 12,
2003, R. 96, Addendum A.
5

»«• i''

mmmm^mmmmmmmmmm

H.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM WAS NOT
PRESERVED, IT MUST BE REVIEWED FOR PLAIN
ERROR.

Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, the error was not obvious.
Indeed, the question of the applicability of the 2001 statute was not raised until the day
before oral argument before this Court. Accordingly, defendant must proceed under the
"onerous plain error standard." State v. Labrurn, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994). To
establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate: (I) an error occurred; (ii) the error
was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
1993).
This Court has long recognized that "if the error was plain to the court, it should
also have been plain to trial counsel, who should have raised an appropriate objection.
For this reason, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel typically is raised in
conjunction with alleging plain error." Labrum 881 P.2d at 906. Indeed, "in any case
where appellate counsel finds himself or herself needing to use the plain error doctrine to
get an issue before the appellate court, a red flag should go up warning of the likelihood
of a concomitant ineffective assistance of counsel claim .. ." Id. at 907.
Here, defendant's trial counsel participated in the case throughout and even filed
and argued a motion to reduce charge based on the 2002 statute without raising this
supposedly obvious error. Yet defendant asserts no claim of ineffective assistance.
Because three or more defense attorneys, wrhom defendant tacitly concedes were
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effective, as well as attorneys for the State and the trial judge participated in the case
without noticing they were using the 2002 statute, it cannot have been obvious.
III.

DEFENDANT IS A THREE-TIME DUI OFFENDER
AND SHOULD BE PUNISHED AS SUCH.

In essence, defendant is asking this Court for a windfall. Even though Utah
imposes enhanced penalties for a third DUI offense in 10 years, defendant believes that
his three DUIs should be counted differently. Because the third DUI occurred 10 days
before the guilty plea to his second DUI, defendant believes his third DUI conviction
cannot be enhanced to a third-degree felony. Such an is offensive to public policy and
should not be adopted by this Court.
In State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court rejected
a similar argument advanced by a defendant in a drug case. Under Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(l)(b), a defendant who is convicted of distributing a controlled substance "is guilty
of a third-degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable under
this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony." The defendant was charged with
three counts of distributing marijuana with the second and third counts enhanced to
second degree felonies as "subsequent" convictions, even though the charges were
brought in a single information. Id. at 312. The defendant argued that the trial court
misconstrued the statute because the intent of the Legislature was to allow the first
offense to serve as a warning, thus allowing the defendant an opportunity to reform. Id.
In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court noted that the plain language of the statute
7

"does not address the timing of the offenses but only the number of convictions and when
they are entered."/d. at 313. The court continued:
According to [defendant's] first argument, the enhancement
provision may not be invoked unless the second offense
actually occurred after the entry of the first conviction. Under
this reasoning, a defendant could commit an offense, be
charged for that offense, and commit another while the
charges were pending without being subject to the
enhancement provisions. Even if the defendant sold narcotics
outside the courthouse while awaiting the return of a verdict
on the first charge, that crime would not qualify for
enhancement under [defendant's] formulation of the statute.
We decline to inject such an amendment into the otherwise
plain language of the statute.
Id.
Like Hunt, defendant argues that before a "conviction" under Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44(6)(a) can act as an enhancement to a new offense, the second conviction must
precede commission of the third offense. See, e.g., Supp. Aplt. Br. at 6. The Hunt court
explicitly rejected this approach based on a reading of the plain language of the repeat
drug offender statute, which imposes enhancements based on the number of convictions,
regardless of the sequence of the offenses and convictions. Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313.
Moreover, defendant is guilty of the precise evil the Hunt court warned against:
That "a defendant could commit an offense, be charged for that offense, and commit
another while the charges were pending without being subject to the enhancement
provisions." Id. Indeed, under defendant's interpretation, the recalcitrant drunk driver
could commit numerous additional offenses in the interval between his second arrest and
8

conviction, none of which would be chargeable as third degree felonies. Such an absurd
result cannot have been the intent of the Legislature and must be avoided.
IV.

DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED AND
CONVICTED OF A THIRD DEGREE FELONY
BECAUSE, AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING, HE HAD
THREE DUI CONVICTIONS.

Defendant claims the 2001 version of the statute supports his claim. He argues
that in the portion of the statute stating "[a] conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is
a third degree felony if it is committed .. . within ten years of two or more prior
convictions under this section," the indefinite pronoun "it" refers to "violation." Aplt.
Supp. Br. at 7. Thus, according to defendant, the triggering event for the enhanced
penalty is the commission of the third offense, not the conviction for the third offense.
Defendant misreads the statute. Under defendant's interpretation, the term
"conviction" at the beginning of the sentence becomes superfluous. If the Legislature had
intended to base enhancements on a third violation, the statute would read: "A violation
of subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is committed... . within ten years of two or
more prior convictions under this section .. ." Such an interpretation goes against rules of
statutory construction requiring a reviewing court to construe a statute in a way that gives
effect to all terms. See Beynon v. St George-Dixie Lodge #1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d
513, 518, n. 21 (Utah) ("Whenever possible, statutes should be construed so that no
portion is superfluous."), cert denied, 510 U.S. 869 (1993). Thus, defendant's
interpretation cannot be correct.
9
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Rather, this Court must assume that the Legislature used the term "conviction"
advisedly. Where there is an ambiguity, this Court should attempt to interpret the statute
in a way that implements legislative intent. "If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its
entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its
intent and purpose." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991);
see also State v. Soma, 846 P.2d 1313,1317 (Utah App. 1993) ("Statutory terms should
be interpreted and applied according to their commonly accepted meaning unless the
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is either 'unreasonably
confused, inoperable [] or in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'")
(quoting Morton Intel Inc. v. Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Com Vz, 814 P.2d 581,
190 (Utah 1991)). The intent and purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) is to
enhance penalties for repeat DUI offenders and, in particular, to make a third DUI offense
punishable as a third degree felony. As shown in section I above, this intent is effectuated
only by reading the statute to provide to that the third conviction, not the third offense, is
the triggering event.
That this has always been the intent Legislature is demonstrated by passage of the
clarifying amendment to the statute in the 2002 general session. In advocating passage of
the amendment, Rep. A. Lamont Tyler, the bill's sponsor, noted the potential ambiguity in
the statute and explicitly rejected defendant's proposed interpretation: "I think this is not
1
10

the intent of the Legislature (inaudible) [and] it should be not the intent of our society."
Floor Debate, statement of Rep. A. Lamont Tyler, Utah Leg., 2002 Gen. Sess., January
25, 2002 (transcribed by Utah Attorney General's Office secretarial staff) (emphasis
added) (Addendum B).
Moreover, a review of the statute as a whole supports this interpretation because
other sections imposing enhanced penalties focus a defendant's convictions, not the
commission of the offenses. Even the section of the statute at issue used prior
convictions, not prior offenses, as the events that allow imposition of enhanced penalties.
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (2001) (enhancements imposed if third DUI is
"within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section") (emphasis added).
Another example is section (3)(a) of the statute, which states that "[a] person convicted
the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a" class A or B
misdemeanor, depending on various factors (emphasis added). Subsection (b) states:
A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty
of a third degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(Emphasis added). Similarly, section (5)(a)(I) states:
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten
years of a prior conviction under this section, the court shall
as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of
not less than 240 consecutive hours.

11
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(Emphasis added). Even section (6)(a) states that a DUI is a third degree felony if
occurring "within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section;. .." The
focus on the number of a defendant's DUI convictions as the measure for enhanced
penalties throughout the statute strongly suggests that a parallel approach was intended
for section (6)(a) and that the third conviction, not the commission of the offense, is the
trigger.
In short, a reading of section (6)(a) of the statue that makes a third DUI conviction
punishable as a third degree felony is most in harmony with the remainder of the statute
and most consistent with legislative intent. Thus, defendant's contrary reading should be
rejected and his conviction of third degree felony DUI affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j ^ 1

day of April, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of April, 2004, to:

JOAN C. WATT
L. MONTE SLEIGHT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Addendum A

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, & ORDER DENYING DEFENSE
MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE

-vsCase No. 021909726
I

NEIL STEVEN PIXTON,

Hon. Ann Boyden
Defendant.
Through counsel, defendant Pixton filed a motion to reduce his "enhanced" driving under
influence of alcohol (DUI) charge, a third degree felony based upon two prior convictions, to a
class B misdemeanor. The issue was briefed, and on November 26, 2002, with defendant
present, the parties' counsel orally argued the motion to this Court. The Court will now deny
defendant's motion, based upon the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon court documents and a letterfromthe Murray, Utah city prosecutor appended
to the State's memorandum, the parties agree on these facts:
1. In May, 1998, defendant Pixton pled guilty and was sentenced for DUI, a class B
misdemeanor, in the Sandy, Utah justice of the peace court.

mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
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FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & ORDER
DENYING MOT. TO REDUCE CHARGE
State v. Pixton
(pixton ffcl) PAGE 2

2. In January 2001, defendant was arrested for DUI in South Jordan, Utah, and that case was
filed as a class B misdemeanor in the South Jordan justice of the peace court.
3. On or about May 15, 2001, defendant was arrested for DUI in Murray, in the case that
eventually was filed in this Court. However, this DUI was initiallyfiled,by citation, in
the Murray justice of the peace court as a class B misdemeanor, for prosecution by
Murray City.
4. On May 24, 2001, defendant pled guilty to "alcohol-related reckless" driving (ARR) in
his South Jordan case, and was sentenced for that class B misdemeanor.
5. Some time after entry of defendant's South Jordan ARR conviction, the Murray City
prosecutor learned of that conviction. Accordingly, on or about December 3, 2001, the
Murray prosecutor dismissed the class B DUI citation in Murray JP Court, and referred
this case back to the arresting police agency for felony prosecution due to the two prior
convictions, in the Sandy and South Jordan JP courts.

.

6. On or about June 21, 2002, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, representing the
State,filedthe Murray DUI case as felony DUI, now pending in this Court, basing the
felony enhancement upon the Sandy and South Jordan prior DUI/ARR convictions.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The defense argues that this case cannot be prosecuted as a third degree felony,
enhanced DUI, because "[a]t the time of filing the enhanced third degree felony charge,
Mr. Pixton had been convicted of only one prior DUI under Section 41-6-44(6)" (Def.
Mem. at 2). He further complains that application of the enhancement to this case

,
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FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & ORDER
DENYING MOT. TO REDUCE CHARGE
State v. Pixton
(pixton ffcl) PAGE 3

violates his constitutional due process right to notice (id. at 4).1 For the following
reasons, this Court rejects the defense arguments:
1. The defense does not dispute that defendant's 1998 Sandy DUI conviction may
apply to enhance this case.
2. The defense does not dispute that in general, a conviction for ARR, such as his
May 24, 2001 South Jordan conviction, can apply to enhance a subsequent DUI
conviction. See Utah Code § 41 -6-44(1 )(b)(ii) (2001).
3. The DUI enhancement statute at issue in this case, section 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001),
states that the enhancement applies upon a third "conviction" within the prescribed
time period; it does not address dates of arrest, nor dates when charges are filed.
4. A "conviction" can mean either an adjudication of guilt awaiting sentencing, or an
adjudication of guilt plus the sentence imposed on that adjudication. In this
particular case, the latter definition can apply, because at the time this case was
withdrawn from the Murray JP court and refiled by the State as an enhanced DUI,
defendant had been twice previously adjudicated and sentenced for DUI and ARR,
respectively.
5. Because defendant had been twice previously convicted of DUI/ARR when this
case was filed as an enhanced DUI, the State legitimately filed this case as an
enhanced DUI.
Defendant also argues that the State, at trial, must prove the prior convictions beyond reasonable doubt. The State

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & ORDER
DENYING MOT. TO REDUCE CHARGE
State v. Pixton
(pixton ffcl) PAGE 4

6. Because the enhancement statute plainly states that prior convictions trigger the
enhancement, there is no constitutional "notice" violation in the application of the
enhancement to this case.
7. The State argues, in the alternative, that under State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah
1995), defendant would be subject to the enhancement even under the definition of
"conviction" as a guilt adjudication without sentencing. Although this Court need
not address this argument, this Court notes that appellate guidance on this issue
would be helpful to the trial courts, in our efforts to fairly and consistently apply
the DUI enhancement statute.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion to
reduce this enhanced DUI charge to a misdemeanor is denied.
DATED this /£& day of

Fe&
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ANNBOYDEN
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

A
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Attomeyibr Defendant

does not dispute this proposition.
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FINDINGS;CONCLUSIONS & ORDER
DENYING MOT. TO REDUCE CHARGE
State v. Pixton
(pixton ffcl) PAGE 5

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was delivered to the following, this
,200g"
L. Monte Sleight
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Kevin Murphy
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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HOUSE BILL 17
2002 GENERAL LEGISLATIVE SESSION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DAY #5, JAN 25, 2002
CLERK: House Bill 17: Multiple driving under the influence offences. L. Lamont Tyler.
SPEAKER: Representative Tyler
REP. TYLER: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I request that Mr. Paul Boyden of the State Board
Association of Prosecutors of (inaudible) come to my desk to answer questions on this bill.
SPEAKER: That would befineRepresentative Tyler
REP TYLER: Thank you. Representatives, House Bill 17 deals with a serious problem. The
law requires that a person needs to be convicted of thefirsttwo DUPs before he committed the
third one in order for that third one to count as a felony. I think this is not the intent of the
Legislature (inaudible) it should be not the intent of our society. What this Bill does is correct
that and provides a third conviction count as a felony without regard to when the offenses were
committed. It also provides that, or clarifies rather, the fact that driving with a (inaudible)
illegally controlled substance of the body (inaudible) count as a DUI and prior conviction which
is reduced later by the court is also counted as a previous conviction. This bill is supported by
the Prosecutors Association, The Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, (inaudible)
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance Abuse
(inaudible). I'd be happy to answer your questions.
SPEAKER: Further discussion to House Bill 17. No further (inaudible). Rep. Tyler, back to
you for summation.
REP. TYLER: We appreciate your support on this bill. Thank you.
SPEAKER: The voting is open on House Bill 17. Seeing all present having voted, Rep. Divory.
Voting will be closed. House Bill 17, having received 70 yes votes and zero no votes passes this
body and will be referred to the Senate for further consideration, madam.

